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MULTINATIONAL ANTITRUST: 
LESSONS FROM THE U.S. EXPERIENCE 
Douglas H. Ginsburg* 
COMPETITION RULES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: PRINCIPLES FROM 
AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE. By Ky P. Ewing. The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International. 2003. Pp. xxi, 456. $ 110. 
The globalization of business has resulted in a host of new issues 
facing antitrust regulators. As they rush to meet the challenges 
presented by the vastly greater volume of international business 
transactions, the increasing consolidation of global business 
operations, and the rapid evolution of computing and communications 
networks, the regulators leave in their wake an increasingly onerous 
burden on businesses engaged in international commerce. There is 
little guidance available, however, to the antitrust neophyte who wants 
to become familiar with these developments. They, as well as legal and 
economic scholars, lawyers, and others already steeped in antitrust law 
- or as it is known outside the United States, competition policy -
will find Ky P. Ewing's Competition Rules for the 21st Century: 
Principles from America's Experience1 to be of great help. 
Beyond its utility as a user's guide of sorts for regulatory 
authorities, Competition Rules for the 21st Century is a book about the 
development of antitrust in the United States. It is this latter aspect 
that serves as the basis for Ewing's policy prescriptions. He relies upon 
the U.S. experience in formulating several conclusions (or "lessons") 
designed to inform future antitrust policies. 
The book is arranged as follows: Chapters One and Two present 
the challenges to antitrust arising from the increasingly global 
marketplace, in the course of which Ewing presents new survey data 
on the size of the antitrust authorities in different countries and the 
resources they devote to their principle activities; Chapter Three 
provides a historical examination of antitrust as it has developed in the 
United States; and Chapters Four and Five set forth the lessons Ewing 
draws from the U.S. experience. Ewing synthesizes history, case law, 
* Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and 
Distinguished Adjunct Professor of Law, George Mason University. B.S. 1970, Cornell; J.D. 
1973, University of Chicago. - Ed. 
1. Ky P. Ewing is a retired partner of Vinson & Elkins LLP. He has also served as a 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the U.S. Department of Justice's Antitrust Division , 
and is a former Chair of the American Bar Association's Section on Antitrust Law. 
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and, as important, economic studies in formulating suggested 
guidelines for competition policy. The book is also a useful reference 
guide, with citations to hundreds of authorities and seven appendices 
ranging from detailed statistics about antitrust and competition 
spending across countries to reprints of economic studies. 
I. THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 
Ewing identifies several specific problems facing courts and 
regulatory authorities entrusted with administering a national antitrust 
law in a global economy. Harmonizing such laws across countries is 
one of Ewing's primary concerns, as well it should be. Businesses 
currently face a maze of duplicative requirements in effecting 
multinational mergers and conflicting rules governing the conduct of 
their business activities. Not that attempts at international 
coordination have been lacking. Ewing reports several such efforts, 
including failed attempts some thirty years ago by the United Nations' 
Council on Trade and Development and its Technology Transfer 
Conferences to adopt competition codes, efforts by both the OECD 
and the WTO - although with slow progress - to harmonize 
competition policies, as well as the more recent and arguably more 
successful efforts of the International Competition Network ("ICN") 
to promote cooperation among national antitrust authorities (p. 51 ). 
Ewing appears most optimistic about the work of the ICN because 
of its dedication to "antitrust only; antitrust all the time" (p. 51). The 
ICN has already adopted "Guiding Principles for Merger Notification 
and Review" and has recommended "best" practices concerning the 
"nexus" between the effects of a transaction and the reviewing 
jurisdiction (pp. 51-54). The continued success of this international 
joint venture is constrained, however, by the difficulties inherent in a 
collective effort of this magnitude. 
For example, countries across the globe have different reasons for 
subjecting businesses to antitrust regulation; some countries are no 
doubt concerned with consumer welfare, but others may have adopted 
competition laws in order to raise costs to foreign rivals. In any event, 
maximizing the benefits of the group may not coincide with the 
desired outcome for any individual country.2 The objectives of 
regulators in a transition or a developing economy, for instance, are 
likely to be quite different from those in a developed economy. 
As a result, success is inextricably linked to the ability of the 
collective to convince some participants to adopt competition laws 
that, while harmonizing the global effort, may inflict greater costs 
2. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND 
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971). 
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upon them.3 Although Ewing does not delve deeply into the mechan­
ics of collective action, he recognizes the difficulty inherent in such 
efforts in stating that "real harmonization" is "a distant goal that will 
require extraordinary effort and willpower to achieve" (p. 71 n.87). 
As Ewing points out later in the book (and as discussed later in 
this Review), the United States' century of experience with antitrust 
may be a powerful predictor of the pitfalls potentially facing the many 
newer competition regimes around the globe. These pitfalls include, to 
mention but a few, targeting "big business" at a substantial cost in 
terms of lost efficiencies; protecting small (and often inefficient) 
competitors merely because they are small; and using competition 
policy to redistribute wealth. Many of the lessons learned in the 
United States are applicable both to countries new to the regulation of 
competition and to countries that have been promulgating and 
enforcing such regulations for decades - indeed, the United States 
itself could and should (but too often does not) learn from its own 
failures and shortcomings in administering its antitrust laws. 
For countries new to the field of antitrust, observation and study is 
far preferable to learning-by-doing; doing should be limited, at least at 
the outset, to such steps as are necessary to prevent practices that, in 
the experience of countries with a long history of antitrust 
enforcement, have been proven to be anticompetitive. A country 
should not, therefore, require premerger notification based solely 
upon a merging entity having derived revenues from that country, as 
do some of the countries Ewing examines (p. 32). This type of 
overreaching sacrifices consumer welfare for no apparent reason other 
than the government's desire to collect merger review fees. 
Errors of over-enforcement are likely to be particularly costly in 
today's high-tech economy, where "information goods" and other 
forms of intellectual property account for an increasingly substantial 
portion of economic activity. Ewing makes this point in his discussion 
of network effects. Direct regulation of the competitive process -
price controls, for example - in old-economy industries such as 
utilities, may impose costs upon both the producer and the consumer 
if the regulated price is set too low.4 The cost to the producer is equal 
to the difference between the market-clearing price and the regulated 
price, multiplied by the quantity supplied, plus the producer's share of 
the deadweight loss attributable to units not produced. The burden of 
such costs, though, will not necessarily drive the firm from the market; 
it will more likely cause the firm merely to produce less than the 
3. See Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, Contracting Problems and Regulation: 
The Case of the Fishery, 72 AM. ECON. RE.v. 1005 (1982). 
4. See generally ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES 
AND INSTITUTIONS (1971). Of course, there are also losses when the regulated price is set 
too high. 
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efficient quantity of output. Also, the firm's loss - aside from the 
deadweight loss, which is not recoverable - coincides with a 
corresponding gain to consumers from the lower price charged on the 
quantity actually supplied to the market. In markets for information, 
communications, and other network-based goods, however, the cost of 
a regulator's error may be much greater if it stymies innovation. 
Information-technology industries, such as computer software, are 
often characterized by high fixed and low marginal costs - indeed, 
marginal cost may be close to zero. In such industries marginal cost is 
less important in determining firm behavior; competition may be for 
the market (or a sizable share of it) rather than within the market.5 To 
the extent a regulated business cannot cover its fixed costs, it may 
disappear altogether, and with it, the innovations it may have been 
able to bring to the market. Ewing's advice to those countries now 
adopting competition policies - specifically, that they should look 
closely at the U.S. experience and its episodes of costly and often 
fruitless efforts to regulate competition - may not go far enough in 
light of the economics of new-economy industries. To the extent 
competition authorities in developing countries, and indeed developed 
countries such as the United States itself, can learn from these 
mistakes, they may avoid the potentially harsher consequences likely 
to result from failed regulatory policies in today's high-tech and, not 
incidentally, more globalized economy. 
*** 
Not surprisingly, the administration of an antitrust regime comes at 
a high price. It is difficult to determine the exact price, however, 
because many of the costs are unknowable (e.g., opportunities 
foregone due to a blocked merger or a prohibited business practice). 
For a lower bound, Ewing tries to calculate the worldwide observable 
costs of antitrust and to determine the distribution of resources as 
between merger review and anticartel enforcement in each country. 
Ewing draws three general conclusions from his analysis: (1) the 
globalization of antitrust rules is real; (2) the priority given to anti­
cartel enforcement versus merger control varies significantly across 
countries; and (3) different countries devote starkly different 
percentages of their GDP to competition policy (pp. 21-29). 
One of the most interesting statistics Ewing provides is the 
percentage of personnel working in "anti-cartel enforcement" as 
opposed to "merger and acquisition enforcement" (pp. 27-28). He 
reports that in the United States, thirty-eight percent of combined 
5. See, e.g., CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC 
GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY, 261-96 (1999); see also Harold Demsetz, Why 
Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968). 
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Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission personnel are 
engaged in merger-and-acquisition enforcement, versus only fourteen 
percent engaged in anticartel enforcement. This may at first seem an 
odd distribution; after all, cartel-busting is generally thought to be the 
most important and in fact the primary concern of antitrust.6 Indeed, 
William Kolasky, until recently a Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
has stated that "[d]etection and prosecution of hard-core cartels 
should be every competition authority's top enforcement priority."7 
The implication of Ewing's calculation is that, at least in the 
United States, merger review enjoys an unduly prominent position in 
the hierarchy of antitrust enforcement activities. Further, Ewing 
identifies merger review as a growing phenomenon, practiced by most 
of the more than 100 countries that currently have competition laws 
(p. 30). And it is a high-cost activity. Ewing estimates the direct cost of 
global antitrust enforcement at nearly $11 billion per year, an amount 
which goes largely to pay the salaries of public- and private-sector 
lawyers, economists, and staff (p. 32). (Again, this figure does not 
capture the indirect costs arising from antitrust policies that prevent 
wealth-enhancing business combinations or practices.) Clearly, a large 
portion of the direct cost is attributable to merger review. Ewing finds 
this particularly disturbing in light of his estimate that "[l]ess than 1 % 
of . . . global [premerger] filings result in any challenge to the 
transactions by governments" (p. 34). Significantly, he notes that the 
"United States got along quite nicely without a premerger notification 
law for 88 years, relying on the Sherman Act's Section l" (p. 34). 
Merger review presents problems in addition to its high direct cost. 
Ewing quotes practitioners, regulatory authorities, and academics, all 
of whom point to the increasingly difficult task merging entities face in 
coordinating and simultaneously complying with a score or more of 
premerger reviews in as many different countries (pp. 36-38). The 
number of countries reviewing a merger has increased in part because 
there are more countries that, like the United States, use an "effects" 
test, which requires a premerger filing whenever a merger "may" 
lessen competition in that country (pp. 19-20). Of course, actual effects 
are likely to be felt in many fewer countries, and in fewer still could 
there be any serious concern about an adverse effect upon 
competition. 
The problem of conflicting competition policies is becoming 
significant, as was shown in 2001 when U.S. authorities approved the 
merger of General Electric and Honeywell - both U.S. companies -
6. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001 ). 
7. P. 42 (quoting William J. Kolasky, North Atlantic Competition Policy: Converging 
Toward What?, Address at the BIICL Second Annual International and Comparative Law 
Conference (May 17, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/11153.htm). 
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only to have the European Union prohibit it. The experience of the 
GE/Honeywell merger review presents a good opportunity to explore 
the benefits of coordinated policies.8 There is not yet in place, 
however, a forum to discuss such differences in regulatory postures 
and to weigh costs and benefits to the global economy. An unfocused, 
uninformed merger review is more likely in a framework relying upon 
uncoordinated country-by-country reviews. 
Where and how, then, does one begin to reform the current 
hodgepodge of individualized premerger regimes? As previously 
stated, Ewing is optimistic about the ICN as a forum for reform 
because it has already taken important steps to coordinate merger 
review (pp. 51-58). As Ewing acknowledges, however, much work 
remains to be done. Further progress may be possible but will surely 
be limited by the unwillingness of any nation to cede its role in merger 
review to a supranational antitrust authority.9 (The cession of such 
authority by member states of the E.U. is not indicative of the 
possibilities because it is part of a more general transfer of political 
power from national to supranational authorities.) 
Ewing raises an alternative, and attractive, solution: refocus the 
attention of antitrust authorities upon ex post rather than ex ante 
review (p. 34), at least where harm to competition is uncertain (that is, 
in all but mergers that would create a monopoly or near monopoly). 
Such an approach would require multinational coordination only 
when a concern about competition actually arises, rather than in each 
instance in which it is thought a merger may have an effect.10 
Considering the low percentage of mergers that occasion any 
premerger enforcement effort - whether to reshape or to prohibit the 
transaction - and the high cost of premerger review, one has to 
wonder why the ex post approach has so widely been abandoned in 
favor of premerger review.11 
Ewing is somewhat generous in attributing the emphasis upon 
premerger notification simply to "bureaucratic convenience" - i.e., 
the idea that it is easier to stop something before it happens than it is 
8. It is important to note, however, that even substantive coordination will not 
necessarily result in agreement; if the GE/Honeywell merger would have produced 
efficiencies in the United States but imposed significant welfare losses in Europe, then the 
merger review was properly concluded by both authorities. 
9. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Scott H. Angstreich, Multinational Merger Review: Lessons 
From Our Federalism, 68 Antitrust L. J. 219, 225 (2000). 
10. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000) (prohibiting mergers or acquisitions "where in any 
line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the 
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly"). 
11. In a footnote Ewing acknowledges but rejects concerns that ex post efforts are likely 
to be cumbersome and ineffective, and "may even hinder creation of useful deals out of fear 
of post-closing exposure." P. 64 n.43. 
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to undo it after the fact (p. 34). There is an alternative explanation: 
premerger review generates rents for both the public and the private 
actors engaged in it. Premerger review is particularly attractive to 
those whose livelihood depends upon antitrust practice because it 
creates work to be done for every transaction regardless of whether 
any harm to competition is likely. No finding of actual competitive 
harm is necessary in order to generate filing fees and to provide high 
levels of private and public employment, particularly for antitrust 
lawyers, who prepare and review the premerger notification papers. In 
addition, the fee-generating aspect of premerger review may be 
particularly attractive to those countries where little, if any, economic 
effect from a merger is likely, because their antitrust authorities need 
not even waste the filing revenues they receive by employing people to 
read the merger notifications. 
Anticartel enforcement would also benefit from closer 
coordination across countries. Ewing rightly focuses upon the elusive 
distinction between a "bad cartel" and a "good joint venture" (p. 45). 
For instance, the adoption of a single communications protocol in an 
ATM network would provide the greatest benefit to consumers by 
allowing them to access their accounts from the largest possible num­
ber of locations; that is, positive network externalities would be max­
imized. As a result, it is likely that competing banks would try jointly 
to establish an industry standard - here a single communications 
protocol - in order to discourage wasteful, duplicative efforts and to 
deliver the greatest possible interoperability to consumers. 
Ewing notes that, in the United States, courts are likely to apply a 
"rule of reason" analysis where collaborations may prove beneficial. 
He is concerned, however, that agency review may result in rejecting 
new practices "if there is any chance, however small, of an anti­
competitive effect" (p. 45). This concern is likely to be amplified in the 
international arena, where the desire to protect domestic businesses 
may lead to a more intensive review of foreign collaborators and to 
the rejection of new technology standards. 
II. THE U.S. EXPERIENCE 
Our understanding of the problems relating to harmonization of 
international competition law, as set forth in Chapters One and Two 
of Competition Rules in the 21st Century, is informed by Ewing's 
detailed description of the U.S. experience in Chapter Three. After a 
brief overview of the history of U.S. antitrust law, Ewing traces the 
strange career of the "concentration thesis" in the United States -
i.e., how measures of industry concentration came to be at the center 
of economic thinking, regulatory action, and court decisions. The 
concentration thesis gave rise to "presumptions," first adopted by the 
enforcement agencies and then given credence by the courts, that 
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certain levels of industrial concentration would lead firms to behave in 
a nonrivalrous way, resulting in supranormal prices and profits. The 
approach was rooted ultimately in Joe Bain's industry studies of the 
1940s linking concentration with higher levels of profitability, which 
suggested concentration as a key factor in the conduct and resulting 
performance of many industries. 
The concentration thesis first gained widespread acceptance in 
U.S. antitrust law during the mid-twentieth century "merger wave." 
The increased levels of industry concentration brought about by those 
mergers quickly became the subject of criticism by both economic and 
legal scholars. By the 1960s, the concern with concentration, already 
prevalent in economic scholarship, had become deeply ingrained in 
the law; for example, in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States12 and United 
States v. Philadelphia National Bank13 the Supreme Court analyzed 
mergers almost exclusively in terms of their effects upon concentration 
in a relevant line of commerce (pp. 107-12). In 1968, when the 
Department of Justice adopted its first Merger Guidelines, they were 
likewise "firmly rooted in a structuralist approach" (p. 112). 
The widespread adoption of the structuralist approach by courts 
and antitrust authorities may be understandable on the ground that it 
provided simple benchmarks by which to evaluate a merger for 
anticompetitive effects. The problem, however, as Ewing makes very 
clear in his review of the economic studies, is that the structural 
approach was, even in 1968, no longer widely accepted in economics 
scholarship - at least not as a reliable method for predicting an effect 
upon competition (pp. 129-44). 
Ewing's examination of the concentration thesis highlights both 
the lag between economic scholarship and its adoption in antitrust law, 
and worse, the tendency of discredited economic ideas, once accepted, 
to persist in legal policy.14 This persistence is evidenced by the 
regulatory authorities' continued reliance upon the structural 
approach in revising the Merger Guidelines even to this day and by 
the agencies' continuing reliance, in litigation of merger cases, upon 
economically antiquated cases such as Philadelphia National Bank. 
What lesson, then, should the reader draw from Ewing's analysis of 
the concentration hypothesis in the United States? Ewing rec­
ommends dropping from the Merger Guidelines the "presumptions" 
- such as concentration levels above which enforcement is presumed 
appropriate - and other formalistic "numbers game" approaches that 
are implicitly based upon the "structure-conduct-performance" 
paradigm (pp. 147-48). But what should take their place? In 
12. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
13. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
14. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 (1991). 
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economics the structure-conduct-performance paradigm has given way 
to more sophisticated modeling of the firm's decisionmaking, such as 
noncooperative game theory.15 Is it too soon to adopt game-theoretic 
approaches in government enforcement policy and perhaps thereafter 
in court decisions? What about the theory of network externalities? If 
Ewing's historical documentation of the lag between economic 
thinking and legal policy is any guide, then these questions may not be 
answered for many years. 
III. LESSONS FROM THE U.S. EXPERIENCE 
In the last two chapters of Competition Rules in the 21st Century, 
Ewing sets forth various lessons from the U.S. experience with 
antitrust. The successful implementation of his prescriptions by other 
countries is, of course, dependent upon preexisting local conditions, 
such as their form of government, level of wealth, and size of the 
public sector. But Ewing's lessons are probably instructive even if they 
cannot be adopted in their entirety due to local circumstances. 
Perhaps the most important lesson Ewing provides is set forth at the 
beginning of Chapter Four: 
No rational person charged today with writing the antitrust rules for the 
United States (or any other jurisdiction) would create the myriad laws, 
federal and state, that are now on America's statute books, enforceable 
by two federal agencies, 54 "state" attorneys general, and private 
persons, containing a bewildering number of exemptions and immunities 
granted at both the national and sub-national levels ... under-girded by 
a growing "antitrust industry" of bureaucrats, lawyers, and economists 
(p. 165). 
Many of Ewing's lessons, including the last clause of the passage 
just quoted, point to a single, perhaps unavoidable conclusion: the 
"antitrust industry" has shown an uncanny ability to replicate and 
proliferate itself. Ewing claims, seemingly against the weight of 
evidence and analysis in his book, that "the U.S. system works fairly 
well" (p. 165). Be that as it may, Ewing's depiction of the U.S. 
experience is at a minimum a cautionary tale, putting other countries 
on notice of the costly - indeed for some less robust economies, the 
potentially disastrous - consequences of making unwarranted 
interventions into the marketplace under the banner of promoting 
competition. This should be particularly relevant to transition 
economies and developing countries where, too often, it seems that 
officials, encouraged by foreign (usually U.S. and E.U.) regulatory 
authorities, believe the adoption of extensive and complex antitrust 
laws and policies is required for a competitive domestic marketplace. 
15. See generally DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TiROLE, GAME THEORY (1991); JEAN 
TI ROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988). 
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Those countries and others considering the adoption of U.S. or 
European-style antitrust laws first should look closely at the U.S. 
experience to determine whether market efficiencies can be achieved 
without creating a large antitrust industry. 
Ewing justly criticizes presumptions used to characterize 
potentially efficient conduct as unlawful simply because of the 
unexamined possibility of a harm to competition. Indeed, many 
business practices that were first proscribed by courts as per se illegal 
- that is, as presumptively anticompetitive - without the benefit of a 
sophisticated economic analysis, are now routinely accepted as 
procompetitive or innocuous in most circumstances. For example, 
maximum resale pricing was at one time per se illegal but is now 
governed by the rule of reason.16 
Ewing's discussion of presumptions focuses upon those that would 
tend to prohibit certain business practices. Presumptions need not 
have this restrictive character, though. For instance, one useful 
presumption, although rarely adopted by regulatory authorities or the 
courts, would deem new business practices acceptable absent a proven 
harm to consumer welfare. Indeed, Judge Easterbrook developed a set 
of presumptions along this line in his classic article, The Limits of 
Antitrust.17 His proposed "filters" were designed to "screen out 
beneficent conduct" and pass to courts only those practices likely to 
raise prices and reduce output.18 Further, the default action under 
Judge Easterbrook's approach was to allow a practice rather than to 
prohibit it, because a market may correct a market imperfection, but it 
usually cannot correct an error made by a court. Ewing's specific 
lessons from the U.S. experience, discussed below, might best be 
considered in this vein - that is, as default prescriptions for courts or 
regulatory authorities faced with uncertain or difficult questions either 
of fact or of economic analysis. Finally, it is useful, as I have suggested 
above, to view presumptions (at least those aimed at prohibiting merg­
ers or business practices) as another way of sustaining the antitrust 
establishment and expanding its reach; the use of presumptions and 
simplistic benchmarks allows investigation and enforcement activities 
without the need to find actual harm to competition. 
Ewing draws several "specific lessons" based upon the U.S. 
experience. His first is to "BELIEVE IN THE 'FREE MARKET' AND 
A VOID THE 'INTERVENTIONIST' APPROACH" to antitrust (p. 167). 
This obviously is not a prescription that is easily implemented, but it is 
wise counsel nonetheless. Markets are to a large degree self­
correcting, whereas improvident political interventions in markets are 
16. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997). 
17. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1984). 
18. Id. at 39-40. 
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hard to correct. 
Another of Ewing's specific lessons is to take care to "GET THE 
PURPOSE OF COMPETITION-POLICY RIGHT" (p. 170). He argues that 
efficiency, not competition, should be the goal of antitrust policy (p. 
180). Manipulating antitrust law to achieve "fair" (meaning low) 
prices or to protect "small business" is sure to be inefficient. 
Correlatively, "big business" should not automatically be targeted for 
public control; large firms have grown large for a reason, and that 
reason is usually their superior ability to satisfy their customers. 
Ewing ultimately settles upon the notion that it is efficiency that 
drives consumer welfare: competition is simply the usual means of 
achieving efficiency; it is not an end in itself. In support of this point, 
Ewing cites Lawrence Summers, who instanced high-tech networks as 
an area where efficiency requires us to rethink our views of 
competition and of the competitive process. Summers emphasized 
efficiency in stating that the need for common technology standards to 
take advantage of network effects "is as plausibly an argument against 
antitrust action, because it suggests that dividing those markets will 
reduce efficiency, as it is plausibly an argument for antitrust action on 
the grounds that monopoly power is more likely."19 Although network 
economies do not as readily admit marginal-cost pricing as an 
appropriate measure of efficiency, it would be a mistake, as discussed 
in Part I, to say that competition is not necessary to achieve efficiency 
in network economies. Rather, competition may take a different form: 
instead of competing for market share based upon price or 
incremental quality advantages, firms may compete for all or nearly all 
of the market through more radical forms of innovation. 
The U.S. experience with the concentration thesis, as described by 
Ewing and discussed in Part II above, sounds an important cautionary 
note as we consider the response of antitrust regulators to network 
and other new technologies. The structure-conduct-performance 
theory of economics, which has since been shown to be "spurious" (p. 
101), is still relied upon by courts and the regulatory authorities. 
Current economic thinking about networks and information 
economics is still nascent and unsettled. At the very least, then, courts 
and regulatory authorities should be careful to avoid prematurely 
adopting some of these theories for, as Ewing's description of the 
concentration thesis suggests, they may be around much longer than 
they prove to be reliable. 
Another of Ewing's specific lessons addresses the problems 
inherent in defining a "relevant market" (pp. 182-83). Before a firm 
can be identified as having market power, the contours of the market 
19. P. 182 (quoting Lawrence H. Summers, Competition Policy in the New Economy, 69 
ANTITRUST L.J. 353, 358 (2001)). 
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must be determined. The standard approach consists of defining both 
a "product" market and a "geographic" market. Ewing finds fault with 
that approach because the methods used by regulators are inconsistent 
and often bear little relation to the competitive dynamics of the 
market in question (pp. 185-87). Ewing raises concerns that 
mechanical application of certain "rules of thumb," such as the "Small 
But Significant and Non-Transitory Increase in Price" ("SSNIP") test, 
mislead rather than inform regulators (pp. 188-90). The SSNIP test 
asks whether "there exist substitutes to which a consumer would 
switch in response to a small but significant (i.e., 5 or 10 percent) price 
increase in the product in question."20 Ewing criticizes the SSNIP test 
because its seemingly rigorous application to the factually complex 
task of defining a market gives a false sense of accuracy to what is 
really no more than survey evidence (pp. 188-90).21 Ewing advises 
regulatory authorities to look more closely at alternative ways of 
determining the relevant market, starting with those taught today in 
business schools (p. 191).22 Business people, after all, have the greatest 
incentive to gauge accurately who their competitors are. If they err, 
they lose; if an antitrust regulator errs, we all lose. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Competition Rules for the 21st Century: Principles from America's 
Experience concludes with ten "principles for crafting competition 
policy laws for the 21st century" (pp. 225-43). These principles 
summarize the main points of the book. They indicate a limited role 
for antitrust intervention in the marketplace, reflecting the complexity 
and uncertainty of economic systems, and a law that is applied, when 
necessary, in a focused, fact-intensive, and thoughtful manner. In 
practice, implementing such an approach will be difficult. As Ewing's 
description of the U.S. experience demonstrates, success in adopting 
efficiency-enhancing antitrust policies and enforcing them in their 
intended manner is likely to be difficult even if the pitfalls are known 
in advance. Those charged with implementing antitrust policies in the 
21st century would be well-advised to keep a copy of Ewing's book 
close at hand. 
20. P. 188 (quoting United States v. Engelhard Corp., 970 F. Supp. 1463, 1467 (M.D. Ga. 
1997) (quoting Post-Trial Submission of the United States at 8 (No. 6:95-cv-45)) ). 
21. Similar critiques have been leveled at regulators' and courts' reliance upon more 
standard economic techniques of measuring market power, such as cross-elasticities, in a 
relevant market. E.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust 
Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981); see also Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust 
Revisited, 147 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 24, 25-26 (1991). 
22. Ewing cites Michael Porter's "Five Forces/Diamond Approach" as one example. P. 
191 (citing MICHAEL E. PORTER, ON COMPETITION (1998) and others). 
